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“The brains of humans and other animals 
contain a mechanism that is designed to give 
priority to bad news”  
Daniel Kahneman (2011) 
1. Introduction  
Social media platforms allow news to travel much faster and wider compared to any time 
in the past. Social media platforms have become a popular open forum for analyzing 
economic/financial issues and, equally important, they reflect topics of public interest 
minute by minute. It has long since become essential for economic commentators, 
policymakers and their followers. For instance, New York Times Columnist and 2008 
Nobel Laurate Paul Krugman runs a Twitter account with some 1 million followers during 
the Greek-related Eurozone crisis in early 2013; his followers have risen to approximately 
4.6 million (in May 2020).1 Also updating in real time are dedicated websites such as Real 
Time Economics of The Wall Street Journal (with its twitter account having approximately 
0.8 million followers) that discuss hot economic topics. Not surprisingly, people pay 
attention. This is more so in the case of US President Donald Trump who currently has 
some 79.4 million Twitter followers (in May 2020) and what he writes makes a(n) (financial) 
impact. In fact, in an interview with The Financial Times on April 2, 2017, President 
Donald Trump noted “without the tweets, I wouldn’t be here”.2  
There are good reasons to suggest that the information content on Twitter 
differentiates from the respective content of traditional news outlets. In terms of speed, 
for instance, reports published on social media sites can be accessed instantly whereas 
traditional media takes time to disseminate information (this is limited to once a day for 
newspapers; obviously television or radio can update their reports more frequently). In 
terms of creation and dissemination of content, traditional media work on the ‘one-to-
many’ principle; an Editor decides what news is and the news consumers (readers and 
viewers) do not play a role in the creation or dissemination of content. Contrast this with 
the ‘many-to-many’ principle of social media, where any individual can create and share 
content. In terms of interactivity, all comments in social media occur in real time; 
traditional media instead is tightly patrolled. Further, social media connects billions of 
individuals across the globe, whereas traditional media limit their reach to the number of 
readers or viewers that individual newspapers or channels may have.3  
 
1 Krugman is the top economist in terms of followers (see: https://ideas.repec.org/top/top.person.twitter.html).  
2 See: https://www.ft.com/content/9ae777ea-17ac-11e7-a53d-df09f373be87.  
3 Worldwide, weekly social media use for news has enjoyed a steady increase over the 2013-2017 period (only 
to drop slightly in 2018); for 2018, the use was 45% in the US, 39% in the UK, 36% in France and 31% in 
Germany. See: http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2018/overview-key-findings-2018/.  
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The recent literature provides convincing evidence that information on social media 
influences financial markets. For instance, Azar and Lo (2016) show that publicly available 
tweets contain valuable information that can be used to forecast stock market returns over 
and above the impact of asset pricing factors. Agrawal et al. (2018) find that a sentiment 
index constructed based on social media, influences the supply and demand for liquidity 
in the stock market; they also find evidence supporting the capacity of social media to 
unveil insights above the respective insights of more traditional news feeds. By focusing 
on the global equity market, Beckers (2019) compares the predictive content of social 
media and traditional news to find that the information set delivered by the former is not 
different from the latter.  
This paper is motivated by the agenda-setting theory of media in politics (see e.g. the 
discussion in Schroeder, 2018a and Neuman et al., 2014) which suggests that the media 
have the power to determine important issues of the day and this applies to both Twitter 
and traditional media. This is not contradictory; as social media gain popularity over time, 
there is a shift from their ability to set the agenda to their power to set the agenda (Conway 
et al. 2015, refer to this as the crux of the current agenda-setting debate).  
More specifically, the paper focuses on the information content of Twitter and 
traditional news media to raise the following question: does it matter where you get the 
information from, and if so, why? To answer this question, we proceed as follows. For a 
given topic related to financial markets, we compare within a bivariate testing framework, 
news appearing in both news sources and address the issue of which source of information 
“sets the agenda”. We recognize, however, that verification of the agenda-setting 
hypothesis lacks sufficient practice in the absence of relevant validation. Therefore, we 
move on to validate the derived inference from the testing of the agenda-setting hypothesis 
within the context of financial markets. If, for instance, one source of news (say Twitter) 
is setting the agenda, then the underlying information set should provide insights that go 
beyond the respective insights of the competing source (say traditional media) in affecting 
financial markets (in terms of impact and duration). Therefore, if the hypothesis holds for 
one news source and is indeed validated, then it matters where one searches for 
information since a well-timed update of the information set will result in more informative 
investment decisions.  
With this in mind, we examine the agenda-setting hypothesis by testing its empirical 
relevance for a topic related to the sovereign bond markets. We focus on the Greek debt 
crisis because it relates to a set of characteristics that allow an “apples-to-apples” 
comparison of the two news sources. These characteristics are as follows: first, the time 
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persistence of the crisis that permits collection of data for a reasonable duration (our 
sample extends from 3/5/2012 to 6/24/2016, including 1,573 daily observations); second, 
the global interest for the crisis that creates adequate volume of resources and, third, the 
existence of the unique and untranslated acronym “Grexit” that directly refers to the Greek 
debt crisis.  
Thus, we construct a unique time series dataset based on “Grexit” related news from 
both news sources. The comparison is conducted within a context that grants topic 
homogeneity, global geographic coverage, and inclusion of all potential languages. By 
selecting a topic that is described by the untranslatable term “Grexit” (adopted by financial 
reporters, commentators, and individuals), we establish, to a great extent, topic 
homogeneity. Twitter readily allows for global coverage. In order to establish the same 
geographic coverage for the traditional news outlets, we collect full-text documents from 
around the world based on more than 3,700 news sources (newspapers, magazines, 
broadcast transcripts from TV and radio as well as wire services). Finally, the untranslatable 
nature of the “Grexit” term allows us to identify tweets and text documents irrespective 
of their language. Methodologically, we test in a bivariate system the lead/lag relationship 
of the two news sources by conducting the Dufour et al. (2006) non-causality test that relies 
on the estimation of multiple-horizon Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) specifications. In 
addition, the response of one news source to a shock on the other source is evaluated by 
implementing the Jordà (2005, 2009) local projections approach, relying also on multiple-
horizon VAR specifications.  
The paper then examines the validity of the agenda-setting hypothesis by 
concentrating on Eurozone’s sovereign bond market. More specifically, we focus on the 
borrowing costs of Eurozone’s peripheral countries (namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain; hereafter the GIIPS). For comparison reasons, we also consider France 
as a core Eurozone country. In particular, we look at the differential impact of the “Grexit” 
mentions coming from Twitter, traditional news media and the orthogonal Twitter (we 
take out the effects of the traditional news in the latter) on the sovereign spreads, over and 
above the impact of economic/financial fundamentals, namely measures of default risk, 
liquidity risk and global financial risk. Sovereign bond spreads are defined as the difference 
between the 10-year government bond yield in each of the GIIPS and France relative to 
the German government bond yield. Methodologically, we act in a similar manner as in 
testing the agenda-setting hypothesis. The predictive capacity at different horizons of each 
news source over the sovereign spreads is evaluated by the Dufour et al. (2006) non-
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causality test, while each news source impact on the sovereign spreads is estimated by the 
Jordà (2005, 2009) local projections approach.  
We have three main findings. First, there is a bidirectional information flow between 
Twitter and traditional news outlets, suggesting not only that both types of news serve as 
important empirical predictors for the respective market, but also that the ‘old’ (traditional 
news) and the ‘new’ (Twitter) media are connected. This connection brings into the analysis 
the concept of ‘hybrid’ media (Chadwick, 2013). Indeed, rather than making arbitrary 
distinctions according to simplified categories (such as ‘old’ versus ‘new’ media, or bloggers 
versus journalists), Chadwick (2013) postulates the side by-side existence of both media. 
Nevertheless, we find that the impact of Twitter on traditional news is more prolonged, 
stronger, and more robust (in terms of statistical significance) than the reverse. This finding 
gives prominence to Twitter as the agenda-setting news source in the context of the Grexit 
related discussion.   
Second, the impact of Twitter’s “Grexit” mentions on the Greek sovereign spread 
is positive and of higher magnitude than that of the traditional news outlets; in addition, 
the predictive power of Twitter persists even by taking out the effects of the traditional 
news (in terms of orthogonalizing the Twitter variable on the traditional news variable). 
Hence, the validation testing results robustify the role of Twitter as an agenda-setting news 
source in the sovereign bond market. This finding underlines the increasing power of 
information that appears and is shared on Twitter, bringing into the picture the importance 
of regulating social media; we return to this very issue in Section 6 where we discuss our 
main findings more in detail. Finally, our analysis shows weak contagion effects primarily 
for the case of Portugal and Ireland.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature and Section 3 
discusses the data used. Section 4 provides an outline of the methodology, whereas Section 
5 reports the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 provides a discussion on our findings and 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review  
Rising social media popularity might explain why Twitter has recently decided to double 
the length of the classic 140-character tweet to 280.4  Twitter is extremely popular with 
journalists.5  Journalists tend to tweet immediately a breaking news story and often let their 
 
4 See: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-07/brevity-begone-twitter-doubles-tweet-limit-to-280-characters.  
5 Journalists were making up nearly a quarter (24.6 percent) of Twitter’s authenticated users according to a 
2015 report (see: https://www.poynter.org/news/report-journalists-are-largest-most-active-verified-group-twitter).  
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audience know that full coverage will appear on the newspaper’s site soon. Since 2013, at 
least half of Twitter users in the US have reported getting news on the site; in 2017, 
however, that share went up to 74% and then fell slightly to 71% in 2018.6  It is also 
interesting to note that Bloomberg has recognized the rapidly growing importance of 
Twitter in releasing financial information by integrating, since 2013, real-time Twitter feeds 
in its financial platform. In 2018, Bloomberg and Twitter expanded their relationship so 
that enterprise clients could incorporate Twitter-relevant news to their advanced trading 
strategies.7  Despite the popularity of Twitter, a recent survey by Shearer and Gottfried 
(2017) notes that “many social media news consumers still get news from more traditional 
platforms”. For instance, 55% of Twitter users often get news from news websites and 
11% of Twitter users often get news from print newspapers.8   
Twitter has become very popular in politics as it proxies attention paid to political 
issues (Barberá et al., 2019). It has been shown to have some predictive power for election 
outcomes in the US (Heredia et al., 2018), the UK (Boutet et al., 2012), Germany (Tumasjan 
et al., 2010) and around the world (Gayo-Avello, 2013). In examining the issue of whether 
Twitter or traditional media “set the agenda”, existing studies find that the relationship 
between Twitter and traditional media is generally reciprocal. This simultaneity of ‘old’ and 
‘new’ relates to the concept of ‘hybrid’ media (Chadwick, 2013) which seeks to integrate 
these seemingly disparate mediums (Twitter and traditional news).9 Noting the lack of a 
model of how social media work differently from traditional media, Schroeder (2018b) 
views the new media as complementing traditional media rather than constituting a break 
with them.10 
 
6 See: http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017/ and http://www.journalism.org/ 
2018/09/10/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2018/.  
7 See: https://www.bloomberg.com/company/announcements/bloomberg-launches-twitter-feed-optimized-trading/. 
8 Although Facebook is the first among social media as news source, we focus on Twitter. This is justified 
by the nature of the topic. As the topic is about the sovereign risk of a country, the ideal user profile demands 
high education with capacity to comprehend economic topics. Twitter users fit better this profile as they are 
more educated relative to the users of other social media (Mitchell et al., 2012). Dergiades et al. (2015) confirm, 
for the same topic, that the number of Grexit mentions mainly come from Twitter rather than Facebook.  
9 Chadwick (2013) notes that social media were central to Barack Obama’s 2008 election campaign. At the 
same time, Obama’s social media strategy was linked to old-fashioned mass-rallies of supporters and was 
coordinated with mass events, which, in turn, were carefully timed to generate maximum exposure on 
traditional media (television and newspapers). This suggests that older and newer media and political 
strategies have now become connected in a number of ways. 
10 Schroeder (2018b) notes that during the 2016 US presidential primaries, Donald Trump dominated the 
news headlines on the side of the Republican race to become the nominee largely because of Twitter, where 
he tweeted some rather controversial positions on a range of issues. These positions were subsequently 
featured in traditional media (TV and newspapers). In fact, traditional media appeared to give a lot of time 
to Trump’s views because the American system is characterized by market competition for audience share 
and Trump’s views boosted media ratings. 
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Neuman et al. (2014) use Granger causality tests for 29 issues (9 of which are 
economic ones, ranging from unemployment to corporate issues) that caught the attention 
of American politics in 2012 to find a two-way causality between traditional media and an 
aggregate index of social media (Twitter, blogs and discussion-forum data). Jungherr (2014) 
relies on Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to show that the temporal dynamics and 
content of Twitter messages are similar to those of traditional media only for some cases 
during the 2009 German federal election. Conway et al. (2015) focus on the 2012 US 
presidential election and use lead-lag cross-correlation coefficients to conclude that Twitter 
influences traditional news and vice versa with varying levels of intensity and differential 
time lags in the case of 7 issues (ranging from economic to healthcare) discussed during 
the election. Kruikemeier et al. (2018) study candidate visibility during the 2012 Dutch 
parliamentary election by comparing how often candidates are mentioned in the traditional 
media and social media (Twitter, Facebook). Using panel data regression analysis, they 
conclude that candidate visibility in the traditional media influence visibility in social media 
and vice versa. 
Twitter is also a point of interest to other fields such as media studies or computer 
science. Araujo and van der Meer (2018) focus on 18 publicly listed companies in the 
Netherlands to show that Twitter activity about organizations has a positive influence on 
media coverage within a two-day window whereas media coverage influences Twitter 
activity positively in the same day and negatively in the following day. Meyer and Tang 
(2015) find that Twitter is widely used by US traditional news organizations as an additional 
channel for disseminating news, supporting the concept of ‘hybrid’ media, while Moon 
and Hadley (2014) demonstrate that journalists in the US utilize Twitter as a supplier for 
collecting information. An earlier study by Zhao et al. (2011) takes a different approach by 
comparing the content of Twitter with a typical traditional news source (The New York 
Times) in the context of unsupervised topic modelling techniques in statistics to show that 
Twitter is a good source of topics on celebrities and brands that have low coverage in 
traditional news media and that Twitter users actively help spread news of important world 
events. 
Increasing focus of the recent finance literature is placed on the impact of social 
media rather than the relationship between social media news and traditional media news 
or their potential differential impact. From a theoretical point of view, media not only 
reflects, but also drives the expectations of managers and investors alike; expectations in 
turn feed into asset prices. To the extent that media content works as a proxy for 
investment sentiment, it carries predictive power for financial assets; at the same time, 
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media visibility and content can increase an asset’s investor base and also direct investment 
attention (see the discussion in Tetlock, 2015 and references therein and the empirical 
evidence, from a historical perspective, in Turner et al., 2018). The empirical literature 
identifies significant social media effects on stock returns, stock volatility and earnings 
surprises (see, among others, Boudoukh et al., 2019; Ben-Rephael et al., 2017; Chen et al., 
2014 and Sprenger et al., 2013). Media tone through a textual analysis of the content across 
newspaper articles has significant predictive power for future house prices (Soo, 2018). He 
(2017) finds that exposure to pessimistic news suppresses hiring and employment 
decisions. Dergiades et al. (2015) identify significant social media effects in sovereign bond 
markets. 
Building on the above literature, we take the relationship between Twitter and 
traditional news outlets to sovereign bond markets, where rises in bond yields add to the 
risk of sovereign default and harm aggregate financial activity. Indeed, Gennaioli et al. 
(2014) use data for 46 countries to focus on the dire consequences of sovereign default on 
aggregate financial activity in the defaulting country; the impact is stronger in countries 
where domestic banks hold more public debt. Gennaioli et al. (2018) use a dataset of over 
20,000 banks in 191 countries to quantify a significant negative relationship between a 
bank’s holdings of government bonds and its lending during sovereign defaults. Altavilla 
et al. (2017) flag the amplification effect of sovereign stress on bank lending to domestic 
firms for a sample of Euro-area banks. Augustin et al. (2018), Wolski (2018) and Bedendo 
and Colla (2015) identify spillover effects from sovereign to corporate risk across Europe. 
The next section of the paper proceeds with a detailed discussion of our dataset 
which will be used in the subsequent empirical analysis. 
 
3. Data  
Carrying out a comparison between Twitter and traditional news media is not a trivial task 
because of a set of emerging challenges that do not permit “apples-to-apples” evaluation. 
For instance, the discovery and classification of a topic necessitate the implementation of 
natural language processing algorithms, which have reduced efficiency when the text size 
is short, as is the case of Twitter. Hence, topic homogeneity is a concern. Other challenges, 
especially for topics of global interest, are the geographic coverage and the language 
coverage. Thus, a direct and meaningful comparison between the two news sources 
demands topic homogeneity and the same geographic and language coverage.   
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To examine whether the information content on Twitter feeds/leads the 
information content on the traditional news outlets (and vice versa), by pre-selecting a 
topic related to sovereign bonds markets, we construct a unique dataset based on the 
“Grexit” mentions coming from the two news sources. Among the existing community-
based content sharing social media (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, Digg, Google+, Reddit), 
Twitter is used extensively as a platform for spreading news and principally 
economic/financial news. Hence, Twitter is used as one source of information with global 
coverage.11 On the other hand, to establish global coverage for the traditional news outlets, 
we collect full-text documents from around the world based on more than 3,700 news 
sources (newspapers, magazines, broadcast transcripts from TV and radio and wire 
services). 
The term “Grexit” was inaugurated in February 2012 by two Citigroup economists 
(Willem Buiter and Ebrahim Rahbari). As such, the sample starts from the first week of 
March 2012 (3/5/2012) and ends in June 2016 (6/24/2016), including 1,573 daily 
observations. For the above period, using as source of data the premium Twitter historical 
database of Followthehashtag,12 we collect 936,837 unique tweets that contain the keyword 
“Grexit” or “#Grexit”. By defining the number of followers of each tweet contributor as 
a measure of influence, then the average influence per tweet is 8,024 and the cumulative 
influence of the 936,837 tweets is 7.5 billion. Our sample covers geographically all 
countries around the globe (collected tweets come from 195 countries) and all languages 
(collected tweets are written in 14 different languages). In more detail, 76.1% of the sample 
tweets are written in English, Spanish and German (42.6%, 22.9% and 10.6%, 
respectively), while the countries ranked at the 95th percentile and above (see in Figure 1 
countries in red color) contribute 79% to the total number of the collected tweets. Figure 
1 groups the 195 countries in percentiles according to the density of contributed tweets. 
Countries in white color signify no contribution to the sample. “Grexit” seems to be an 
issue of discussion for Twitter users from North America and Europe.13 
To construct the series that captures the intensity of the “Grexit” discussion in 
Twitter, we count the collected tweets, on a daily basis, the total number of mentions for 
 
11 Kümpel et al. (2015) mention that 69% of the studies dealing with news sharing use Twitter as a source 
platform. Twitter is in the lead of Facebook (17%), YouTube (12%) and Digg (8%). 
12 See: http://www.followthehashtag.com. The dataset is available from the website for a fee. 
13 The density of the sample tweets for the Eurozone countries is presented analytically in Figure A1.1 (see 
Appendix 1). Given the availability of coordinates for the Twitter data, a higher degree of disaggregation is 
also presented in Figure A1.2 for the European continent (see Appendix 1). Finally, the dynamic evolution 
of Figure A1.2 over time is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WDo1FPH8kwU .    
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both terms “Grexit” and “#Grexit” and we assign each value to the respective day. In 
total, we identify 1,338,086 mentions. The created time series is presented in Figure 2.   
 
 







Figure 2. Grexit mentions in Twitter over time.  
 
 
To construct the respective time-series with a daily frequency for the traditional news 
outlets, we use as source the LexisNexis Academic database. The coverage of the database 
is worldwide, offering access to multilingual text sources coming from newspapers, 
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magazines, broadcast transcripts from TV and radio news as well as wire services. Hence, 
for the same sample period (3/5/2012 - 6/24/2016), we collect 40,341 unique text sources 
(e.g. newspaper articles) containing the keyword “Grexit” at least one time. Our sample 
covers geographically all countries around the globe (the collected text sources come from 
83 countries) and all languages (collected text sources are written in 18 different languages). 
In more detail, 84.5% of the text sources from the traditional news are written in English, 
German, Dutch and French (42.5%, 22.7%, 10.8% and 8.5%, respectively), while the 
countries ranked at the 95th percentile and above (see red areas in Figure 3) contribute 63% 
to the total number of collected text items. Figure 3, groups the 83 countries in percentiles 
according to their text item contribution in the sample. Countries in white color signify no 
contribution to the sample. For the traditional news outlets, “Grexit” appears to be a topic 




Figure 3. Traditional news density per country.  
 
 
For the traditional news, we follow the same procedure as in the case of Twitter. 
To build the series that captures the intensity of the topic in the traditional news outlets, 
we count “Grexit” mentions for the collected text items on a daily basis and we assign each 
 
14 The density of the sample traditional news text items for the Eurozone countries is presented analytically 
in Figure A1.3 (see Appendix 1). For the traditional news text items no further disaggregation can be 
conducted (given data availability). 
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value to the respective day. In total, we identify 66,246 mentions. The constructed time-




Figure 4. Grexit mentions in Traditional news outlets over time.  
 
From Figures 2 and 4, we identify two high-activity periods for both series. The first 
high-activity period starts on 3/5/2012 (right after the introduction of the “Grexit” term) 
and ends at 10/12/2012. In particular, following the declaration of Mario Draghi to “do 
whatever it takes to preserve the euro” (7/26/2012),15 the lower “Grexit” media activity 
after 10/12/2012 had to do with ECB’s announcement for the unlimited bond buying plan 
on the secondary market (9/9/2012) and the Greek parliamentary vote on the 2013 budget 
(10/11/2012), which foresaw €13.5 billion budget cuts as a precondition to secure a new 
bailout loan from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (discussed 
on the 10/12/2012 Eurogroup by the Eurozone finance ministers). 
The second high-activity period begins on 12/28/2014 and terminates on 
6/24/2016. The main reason for the reignited “Grexit” discussion was the snap general 
national election announcement, triggered by the failure of the Greek parliamentarians to 
elect a new head of state (12/29/2012). The prospect, revealed by opinion polls, that the 
election outcome might bring into power the radical left party of Syriza was sufficient to 
revive in a keenly manner the “Grexit” discussion.  
 
15 See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html.   
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Descriptive statistics for both series referring to the full-sample and to the two high-
activity samples, are reported in Table 1. The activity on Twitter is more intense than that 
in traditional news, as the Grexit mentions in Twitter reveal higher means and higher 
volatilities (in all samples). For instance, on 7/12/2015, when Grexit mentions in Twitter 
reached their maximum value of 67,948, the respective mentions in the traditional news 
media were 1,047 (this is almost a sixty fivefold difference). The considerably higher 
maximum values observed for Twitter mentions reflect Twitter’s ultra-speed in 
disseminating news. In a failed Eurogroup meeting that took place on 7/11/2015 (that is, 
shortly after the 7/5/2015 Greek referendum), “Grexit” was closer than ever following 
Germany’s proposal for Greece to take a ‘time-out’ of the common currency block for five 
years.16 After the end of the meeting, in the early hours of 7/12/2015, it was Jeroen 
Dijsselbloem’s (President of the Eurogroup) exit doorstep comment “it is still very 
difficult” that triggered the “Grexit” mentions in Twitter to reach their highest value 
(67,948 - 98% increase compared to the previous day). Traditional news reached their 
maximum value (2,312 - 120% increase compared to the previous day) a day later, on 
7/13/2015.   
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the constructed time-series. 
Statistic 
 Variable 
 Twitter mentions  Traditional news mentions  
 fS  S   S    fS  S   S   
Mean  00850.65 0247.76 02310.00  0042.11 014.90 0112.55 
Median  00049.00 0070.50 00433.00  0002.00 003.00 0028.00 
st. deviation  04263.59 0440.18 07011.63  0166.43 025.82 0268.45 
skewness  00009.77 0002.86 00005.72  0008.23 002.32 0004.87 
kurtosis  00113.53 0011.62 00039.87  0085.68 007.96 0031.08 
Notes : fS , S  and S   denote the full sample, the first and the second high-activity periods, respectively.  
 
Moreover, both constructed series appear to deviate vastly from normality, as 
inferred from the respective values of the skewness and the kurtosis. Hence, our empirical 
analysis is executed based on the logarithmic transformation of both constructed time-
series, as a convenient way to (a) deal with the scaling issue of the constructed variables 
and (b) move from highly skewed variables to variables that are closer to normal.    
Additionally, we report analytically, in Table 2, unit-root and stationarity tests for the 
log-levels of the two series (traditional news and the Twitter). The results of Table 2 






This inference about the identified order of integration of the series is further supported 
by the Johansen (1991) cointegration test, which identifies two cointegrating vectors for a 
VAR system of two endogenous variables (see Table 3). The identification of two 
cointegrating vectors in this case, implies the lack of a unit root for both series favoring a 
VAR specification in the log-levels.       
  
Table 2. Unit-root and Stationarity tests  
Test  ADF DF-GLS PP ERS HOAC BG  
joint inference 
Null  I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)  
N   ** * *** *** ** ø  I(0)  
T   * * *** *** ** ø  I(0)  
Notes: ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, DF-GLS is the Generalized Least Squares Dickey-Fuller 
test, PP is the Phillips-Perron test, ERS is Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock optimal point test, HOAC is the 
Bierens’ Higher-Order Autocorrelation test and BG is the Bierens-Guo test. Across the second row, I(1) 
and I(0) reveal the null hypothesis of each test (unit root and stationarity, respectively). ***, ** and * 
signify the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 significance level, respectively. The 
symbol ø  signifies failure to reject the null hypothesis (for all four test statistics of BG test) at the 
conventional levels of significance. The joint inference is concluded by summarizing the individual 
inference of each test.  
 
 










r = 0 r = 1 60.426** 15.494  r = 0 r = 1 52.558** 14.264 
r ≤1 r = 2 07.867** 3.841  r ≤1 r = 2 07.867** 03.841 
Notes: ** signify the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.05 significance level and r refers to the 
number of cointegrating vectors. The reported p-values come from the MacKinnon et al. (1999). 
 
 
The two independently constructed time-series (Twitter and traditional news; see 
Figures 2 and 4), present a high degree of positive linear correlation (the respective 
correlation coefficient is equal to 0.89). This high degree of linear association can be 
perceived as a signal of credibility towards the procedures used to build the series. 
Moreover, to provide further evidence on the robustness of the procedures used to 
construct the raw series, we first disaggregate the news items of both series by country of 
origin17 and then calculate within (i.e. within the countries of each news source) and 
between (i.e. for each country between the two news sources) correlations. The within and 
between correlations for the disaggregated series are illustrated jointly in Figure 5.18 
 
17 Therefore, we have a separate time series for each country that participates in our sample.  
18 The countries presented are the first ten common countries to both news sources with the highest density 





Figure 5. Surface of the within and between correlations by country. 
 
Notes: “Worldwide” is the aggregate series. “All other” refers to all other countries of the sample and is 
constructed by summing each country’s Grexit mentions per day. The left half surface (Region I) shows 
the within correlations for Twitter series (e.g. the left edge of the surface, signified by the blue symbol, 
suggests that the worldwide Twitter time series has a correlation of 0.97 with the Twitter time series of “All 
other” countries). The right half surface (Region II) shows the within correlations for the traditional series 
(e.g. the right edge of the surface, signified by the blue symbol, suggests that the worldwide traditional 
news time series has a correlation of 0.95 with the traditional news time series of “All other” countries). 
For convenience, the between correlations, signified by the bold black line, are presented in the transparent 
surface defined by the two left axes of the figure (e.g. for the case of Germany the correlation between the 
Twitter time series and the traditional news time series is 0.77). 
 
Figure 5 shows that the within correlations for the Twitter series (Region I), on 
average, are higher than the within correlations for the traditional news series (Region II). 
This difference is mainly attributed to the variation in the density of observations per 
country. The density of the disaggregated series in Twitter is much higher than the 
respective disaggregated series in the traditional news (the unique tweets are 936,837, while 
the unique text sources are 40,341). Overall, we may argue that the disaggregated series are 
correlated consistently in a positive manner and primarily to a high degree, robustifying 
further the procedures used to build the Twitter and traditional news series.   
Finally, to provide a visual sense of the disaggregated series’ co-movement, we 
present, for both news sources, the normalized log-level series in Figures 6 and 7. We select 
to normalize the series by their respective standard deviation only for presentation 
purposes, as scaling issues in the raw data make the joint presentation non-informative. 
From both Figures 6 and 7, the series appear to reveal similar peaks and troughs; in 
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addition, the Twitter series shows higher co-movement relative to the traditional news 
series. Overall, the disaggregation process shows that the country level series move in a 













4. Methodology  
4.1. Non-causality at various horizons  
To compare Twitter with traditional news media and examine their impact on the 
sovereign bond market, we rely on the Dufour et al. (2006) causal framework, which 
permits inferences on the linkages of a multivariate process, not only at a single horizon, 
but also at a multiple horizons framework. For finite order VAR processes, impediment in 
testing the non-causality hypothesis, at horizons different than one, is the non-linear nature 
of the imposed restrictions. Hence, the typical Wald-type statistics do not conform to the 
standard asymptotic theory. To alleviate these complications, Dufour et al. (2006) introduce 
a multiple-horizon VAR. After correcting for serial correlation in the error term, the 
validity of the restrictions is examined via a Wald-type test statistic (hereafter DPR).  
Within this context, for the t mtW t w w1( ) ( ,..., )=  vector of random variables, the 
projection of a VAR process of order p  at horizon h  ( )p h( , )VAR  can be written as 










( ) ( 1 ) ( )  (1) 
where h( )  is the constant term at horizon h  h H( 1,2,..., ) , hi
( )
 are m m  
coefficient matrices at horizon h  and finally, j  are m m  coefficient matrices that 





 and j  matrices is described in Dufour and Renault (1998). Eq. 1 is 






W t h W t i u t h( )( ) ( )
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( ) ( ) . Using matrix notation Eq. 2 is represented as:  
 hpW t h W h U t h( )( ) ( ) ( )  (3) 
where h( )  is a matrix of coefficients and hpW h ( )( )  the matrix of the variables.   
The multiple-horizon VAR system in Eq. 3 is estimated by OLS. Once the estimate 
h( )ˆ  of h( )  is attained, we may impose zero restrictions to test the non-causality 
hypothesis at horizon h . Suppose that it is of our interest to know whether the variable 
stw  causes at horizon h  another variable, say qtw  s m(1 ,   q m1    and s q) .  
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To test whether stw  does not cause qtw  given the available information set 





H i p( ) ( ): 0,     1,...,  (4) 
The non-causality hypothesis illustrated in Eq. 4 is tested through the Wald-type test 





ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ[ ( )] = ( ( ) ) ( ) ( ( ) )q T q qH h T R h r RV R R h r  
−
  − − W  
(5) 
where, ( )p n pmR  +  is selection matrix, ˆ ( )q h  is the ( ) 1n pm+   vector of OLS estimates 
for the thq  equation of the VAR system, 1pr   is a vector of zeros and ˆ ˆ( )T qV   is the Newey-
West estimate of the ( ) ( )n pm n pm+  +  variance-covariance matrix. Finally, as noted 
in Dufour et al. (2006), failure to reject the null hypothesis consistently up to horizon 
( 2) 1L m p= − +  is an adequate condition to verify absence of long-run causality. 
Under the Dufour et al. (2006) framework, the testing procedure is adjusted to 
account for integrated processes up to order 1d  . The proposed adjustment follows the 
lines of the lag-extension practice introduced by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). Hence, if 
the involved process is integrated of order d , the optimal lag structure of the system 
illustrated in Eq. 2 is augmented by adding d  extra lags. Once augmentation is done, the 
null hypothesis of no causality is examined by imposing restrictions on the optimal lag 
structure of the system (the extra lags are ignored).   
Unfortunately, the asymptotic distribution of the 0[ ( )]H hW  statistic proves to 
perform quite poorly in small samples. The performance of the test deteriorates further 
when the testing procedure is conducted in VAR systems with large order and with large 
number of variables. Furthermore, inference of non-causality at long horizons also disturbs 
the size and the power of the test as a consequence of the observed serial correlation. To 
control these concerns, Dufour et al. (2006) assess the validity of the null hypothesis by 
implementing a parametric bootstrap procedure. The bootstrap technique performs 
asymptotically considerably better in small samples, provided that the asymptotic 






4.2. Local projections   
Starting from the VAR specification of order p  at horizon h ( )p h( , )VAR , illustrated in 
Eq. 2, we further compute impulse responses based on local projections, as proposed by 
Jordà (2005). To circumvent the algebraic complexity involved in the estimation of the 
impulse responses within a standard VAR framework (introduced by the unique set of the 
VAR coefficients estimates), Jordà (2005) suggests obtaining a new set of coefficients 
estimates for each horizon h  of Eq. 2. For instance, at horizon t h+ , local projections 
constitute the response of the vector ( )W t h+  to an experimental shock on the VAR 
reduced form residuals e  at time t , given the available information set tΙ . Such a response 
is formally presented below:        
 ( ) ( )( ) 1; ( ) 0;ph t t t tE W t h e E W t h e= + = − + =L Ι Ι  (6) 
The structural impulse response is given by the following structural decomposition:    
 10
p p
h h A− = L  (7) 
Hence, to construct ˆ ph , we need an estimate of 
p




h  of Eq. 2, while the impact matrix 10A−  is recovered from the standard ( )pVAR  
specification, after implementing an appropriate identification scheme.    
To assess the shape of the response trajectories, given by (7), and the individual 
significance of each response, we construct the Scheffe´ and the conditional confidence 
bands respectively, as proposed by Jordà (2009). By letting îj  to denote the estimated 
response of the variable i  to a shock on variable j  up to horizon h , then the Scheffe´s 
confidence interval is defined as:    
 ( )2ˆˆ ˆij ij ij HA D c H i   (8) 
where, îjA  is a lower triangular matrix and îjD  is diagonal matrix (both are estimated 
through Cholesky decomposition), 2c  is the critical value that corresponds to the 2  with 
H  degrees of freedom and Hi  is a vector of ones. Additionally, the conditional confidence 
bands are constructed as follows:     
 ( )1/2/2ˆ ˆij ijz diag D   (9) 
where, /2z  is the critical value that corresponds to the standard normal distribution and 
( )1/2îjdiag D  is the vector with the diagonal elements of 1/2îjD . The benefits of using local 
projections over the standard VAR impulse analysis are as follows: first, the robustness 
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over potential model misspecification; second, the joint inference for the impulse response 
coefficients and, third, the applicability of the approach to non-linear models. These 
advantages are discussed more analytically in Jordà (2005, 2009). The disadvantages of the 
local projections approach are summarized as follows: first, the impulse responses derived 
from small samples may be less precise compared to the standard VAR responses 
(although asymptotically local projections remain superior); second, the responses in the 
long run may be quite volatile, and third, the associated standard errors may be serially 
correlated. A comprehensive criticism on the use of local projections is provided by Kilian 
and Kim (2009). 
 
5. Empirical findings   
5.1. The information flow between Twitter and traditional news 
To examine whether there is a two-way information flow between the Twitter ( )tT  and 
traditional news ( )tN  series, we implement the Dufour et al. (2006) non-causality testing 
approach. By identifying the causal dynamics, at horizons greater than one, we can assess 
not only the nature of the relationship between Twitter and traditional news outlets, but 
also the persistence/strength of the predictive content over time. To conduct the causal 
testing, we estimate Eq. 2 for the bivariate vector ( ) ,( )t tW t T N=   by specifying the 
optimal lag-length through the Schwarz Information Criterion assuming that the involved 
variables are not cointegrated.19 Eq. 2 is estimated repetitively to obtain the 0( )[ ]H hW  (or 
DRP) statistics up to twenty horizons (or days) ahead (h =1, 2,…, 20). The significance of 
the statistics is evaluated through bootstrapped p-values with 1000 replications. Moreover, 
starting from Eq. 2, we estimate the twenty periods response trajectory of tT  after a shock 
on tN  (and vice versa), under the Jordà (2005) local projections approach. The overall 
shape and the individual significance for each point on the impulse response path, are 
assessed by calculating respectively, the Scheffe´ and the conditional confidence bands. 
Furthermore, we test the significance of the impulse responses’ twenty-period cumulative 
sum as proposed by Jordà (2009). This way, we assess the direction (positive or negative) 
and the significance of the overall impact of the shock on the target variable. 
 
19 As a robustness check we executed the same estimates under the assumption of cointegration. The derived 
causal inference is qualitatively the same as in the case of no cointegration and is available on request.  
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The p-values, for both hypotheses, are presented jointly in Figure 8.20 The p-values 
for the hypothesis of no-causality running from Twitter to the traditional news outlets 
( )t tT N  and vice versa ( )t tN T  are depicted by the red and the black line, 
respectively. The dark grey area and the light grey area imply significance at the 0.05 and 
0.01 levels, respectively. From Figure 8, we infer that the first hypothesis ( )t tT N  is 
rejected at the 0.01 significance level for all horizons, except the last horizon where the 
rejection takes place at the 0.05 significance level. For the reversed case ( )t tN T , the 
rejection is the regular decision up to the ninth horizon, mainly at the 0.05 significance 
level, while for longer horizons, the non-rejection is the dominant inference. The results 
reveal a two-way predictive capacity between tT  and tN  with the effect of tT  on tN  being 
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Figure 8. DPR causality tests p-values. 
 
20 The values of the DPR statistics for selected horizons are illustrated in Table A3.1 in Appendix 3. 
21 From Figure 8, one can notice that the derived p-values (associated to the hypothesis: traditional news 
non-cause twitter; see back line), illustrate a cyclical pattern. We argue that this cyclical pattern is principally 
related to the newspaper reader behavior, which differs between weekdays and weekends. In particular, as 
more news is consumed during weekends (newspaper circulation is lower on weekdays compared to 
weekends), more articles are published in weekends and therefore more Grexit mentions are expected, on 
average, to be collected. Given that Twitter users often get news from print newspapers (Shearer and 
Gottfried, 2017), the cyclical pattern of the Grexit mentions observed on traditional news, is expected to 
pass on also to the Twitter. We support empirically this argument by fitting a set of periodic regressions to 
both series (Twitter and traditional news) with the purpose to extract the optimal fitted cycle (7 days in both 
cases). Once both series have been de-cycled, the Dufour et al. (2006) non-causal testing is re-applied in order 
to obtain the new p-values over the same number of horizons. Although the initially observed cyclical pattern 
is heavily reduced, the newly derived p-values provide the same qualitative causal inference as in Figure 8. 
These results are available on request. 
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We further construct the twenty periods ahead impulse response of tT ( )tN  
following a generalized one standard deviation shock on tN ( )tT . Figure 9 shows how a 
shock on tT ( )tN  is transmitted to tN ( )tT . In particular, Figure 9.a provides the response 
of tN  to a shock on tT  (continuous black line) along with the 95% Scheffe´ confidence 
interval (grey area) and the 95% conditional confidence interval (blue area). In this case, 
the conditional confidence band supports consistently a positive trajectory, while the 
corresponding Scheffe´ confidence band provides additional evidence that the impulse 
response is expected to fluctuate above zero. Furthermore, at the bottom left hand-side of 
the same figure, we report the twenty-horizon cumulative sum (C. sum) of the responses 
with the respective p-value for testing the significance (C. sum p-value).22 Moreover, the 
magnitude of the responses implies that a 1% increase in the activity of tT  would lead to 
a 1.29% increase in the activity of tN  at the first horizon and to a 15.77% (and significant) 
cumulative increase after twenty-horizons.  
Figure 9.b illustrates the response of tT  to a shock on tN . The conditional 
confidence band does not include zero for any but three horizons, whilst the Scheffe´ 
confidence band suggests a positive trajectory up to horizon nine. The twenty-horizon 
cumulative impact is significant (at the 0.01 level), while a 1% increase in the activity of 
tN  leads to a 0.71% increase in tT  at the first-horizon and to a 6.66% cumulative increase. 
The impulse response results provide evidence in favor of: (i) a positive relationship 
between Twitter and the traditional news media, (ii) a significant bidirectional cumulative 
impact, (iii) a positive and significant impact of Twitter on the traditional news outlets, that 
is more prolonged compared to the respective impact in the reverse direction, and (iv) 
empirical evidence that the twenty-horizon impact of Twitter (for a 1% increase in 
mentions) on the traditional news is approximately 2.37 (=15.77%/6.66%) times higher 
than the reverse impact. Overall, these findings come to enhance the validity of the Dufour 






22 Notice that p-values below the selected value of α imply that a shock on Twitter has a significant twenty 
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9.a. tN  response on tT  9.b. tT  response on tN  
Figure 9. Local projections impulse responses.  
  
Notes : C. sum (20) refers to the twenty-horizon (days) cumulative sum of the impulse responses, while C. 
sum p-value is the resulting p-value for testing the hypothesis that the C. sum (20) is equal to zero. Finally, 




From the executed causal and impulse response analysis (a summary of the results 
is presented in Figure A2.1 in Appendix 2), we find that the information flow between 
Twitter and the traditional news outlets is bidirectional which suggests that both Twitter 
and traditional media set the agenda. Nevertheless, in terms of dynamic interactions, our 
analysis suggests that the impact of Twitter on traditional news is more prolonged, stronger 
and more robust (in terms of statistical significance) than the reverse impact. This gives 
prominence to Twitter as the agenda-setting news source in the context of the Grexit 




5.2. Twitter, traditional news and sovereign spreads in the GIIPS  
The previous section provides evidence of a bidirectional content feed between the two 
sources of news dissemination; furthermore, Twitter feeds in content the traditional news 
outlets more systematically than the other way around. In this section, we move on to 
examine whether the predictive capacity of Twitter towards the bond market is above and 
beyond the respective capacity of the traditional news media. More specifically, we assess 
the predictive capacity of the two news sources over the sovereign bond spreads ( )jtS  for 
the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and France (hence, 1, ..., 6j = ) by 
estimating Eq. 2 for the multivariate vector ( ) ( , , , , , )jt kt jt jt t tW t S M L D E G= .23 We follow 
 
23 The lag-length in all specifications is determined based on the Schwarz Information Criterion. 
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Dergiades et al. (2015) in capturing country-specific idiosyncratic risk by two types of risk, 
that is, the credit or default risk, jtD , and the liquidity risk, jtL , while the international risk 
is quantified by the common Eurozone risk, tE , and the global financial risk, tG . 
In more detail, the sovereign bond spread is defined as the difference between the 
10-year government bond yield in country j  and the German government bond yield. All 
series come from Datastream (see Figure A1.5 in Appendix 1). We construct for each 
country j  the default risk as the difference between the 10-year Credit Default Swap 
(CDS) premia in country j  and the 10-year German CDS premia (all series come from 
Datastream; see Figure A1.6 in Appendix 1). The liquidity risk for each country j  is 
approximated by the difference between the bid-ask spread of the 10-year bond in country 
j  and the bid-ask spread of the respective German bond (all series come from 
Datastream; see Figure A1.7 in Appendix 1). As in De Santis (2014), the Euro area 
common risk factor is identified by the difference between the return on the 10-year KfW 
(Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) bond and the respective return on the 10-year German 
government bond (all series come from Datastream; see Figure A1.8 in Appendix 1). 
Finally, to capture global financial risk we use the Global Financial Stress Index 
constructed by the Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global Research Division (available 
from Bloomberg; see Figure A1.8 in Appendix 1).    
For each country j , we estimate three different versions of the multivariate vector 
( )W t  depending on the news information source ktM  1, 2, 3( )k = . The first specification 
contains the “Grexit” mentions in Twitter ( that is, = )tT . The second specification 
contains the “Grexit” mentions in the traditional news outlets ( that is, = )tN . The 
final specification contains the orthogonalized Twitter variable ( that is, = )tT⊥ , after 
taking out any effect of tN  from tT .
24 For all specifications and for every country j , we 
obtain the DPR statistics up to twenty horizons (or days) ahead by calculating bootstrapped 
p-values with 1000 replications.  
The p-values are analytically presented in Figure 10.25 Starting with Greece, the 
hypothesis of no-causality running from tT  to the Greek sovereign spread (red-line in 
Figure 10.a) is rejected at the conventional levels of significance (0.01, 0.05 and 0.1) up to 
 
24 After regressing the Twitter variable on the traditional news media variable, the orthogonalized variable is 
obtained from the respective residuals. 
25 The values of the DPR statistics for selected horizons are reported in Table A3.2 in Appendix 3. 
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the eighteenth horizon.26 When the tT  is replaced by tN  (black-line in Figure 10.a), the 
rejection of the null hypothesis, at the 0.1 significance level, is verified only up to the sixth 
horizon (exception is the first horizon where the rejection takes place at the 0.05 
significance level). Finally, in the case where the orthogonal Twitter variable ( )tT⊥  is used 
(dashed red line in Figure 10.a), the rejection of the null hypothesis at the conventional 
levels of significance persists up to the seventh horizon (exception is the fifth horizon). 
The testing results reveal that the effect of tN  on the Greek sovereign spread is more 
short-lived (6 days) compared to tT  (18 days), while tT  continues to cause the Greek spread 
for several horizons (7 days), even when it is orthogonal to tN .
27  
To examine possible contagion effects from the news related to the Greek debt crisis 
towards the remaining countries, we perform the same testing procedure by replacing the 
Greek sovereign spread with each country’s respective sovereign spread. The causality 
results indicate evidence of contagion, mainly in the case of Portugal. Moreover, in the 
case of Ireland the evidence is weak, while there is no evidence of causality for the 
remaining countries. In particular, for Portugal the hypothesis of no-causality running from 
the tT  to the sovereign spread (red line in Figure 10.d) is rejected at the conventional levels 
of significance for sixteen out of the twenty horizons. Similar inference is obtained for the 
tN  variable, with rejection occurring for nineteen out of the twenty periods (black line in 
Figure 10.d). Furthermore, for the tT⊥  variable, we fail to reject the null hypothesis at any 
horizon, implying that Twitter conveys no additional information relative to the traditional 
news outlets.  
 
 
26 As the number of followers is available for each tweet, the followers weighted Twitter series (over the raw 
data) is expected to be a superior metric in explaining bond market movements. The reason for not adjusting 
each tweet with the respective followers, is the “apples-to-apples” comparison framework between the two 
news sources. If  we were to implement the followers’ adjustment for the tweets, an equal treatment approach 
would be needed to also adjust the traditional news by the respective number of readers (or even the viewers 
if the text source comes from a TV transcript). Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, such data is not 
available and therefore an equivalent adjustment for the traditional news series cannot be performed. In any 
case, we find that the followers’ weighted Twitter series does not offer apparent superiority in explaining the 
Greek spreads or the traditional news over the unweighted series. Results based on the followers’ weighted 
Twitter series, are available on request. 
27 Our results persist even when both series are scaled by their respective standard deviations. Additionally, 
the causal inference remains qualitatively similar when the disaggregated at country level (for selected 
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10.e DPR causality tests p-values 10.f DPR causality tests p-values 
 
Figure 10. Full-sample DPR p-values for the GIIPS and France. 
 
 
Focusing on Ireland, only the tT  variable appears to predict the Irish spread for the 
first three horizons (red line in Figure 10.b). In all other cases, we are unable to reject the 
no-predictability hypothesis. For the remaining three countries (that is, Italy, Spain and 
France), the derived inference is uniform; no effect on the spreads can be traced for any 
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variable or horizon (Figures 10.c, 10.e and 10.f; a summary of the results is presented in 
Figure A2.2 in Appendix 2).28, 29 
Moreover, we construct the twenty periods ahead impulse response trajectory of 
each country’s spread, following a generalized one standard deviation shock on tT , tN  
and tT⊥ . Figure 11 shows the transmission of these shocks to each country’s spread. All 
impulse trajectories are accompanied with the 95% Scheffe´ confidence interval (grey area) 
and the 95% conditional confidence interval (blue area). At the bottom left hand-side of 
each graph, the twenty-period cumulative sum (Cum sum) of the responses and the 
resulting p-value for testing the significance (Cum p-value) are reported.  
Starting with Greece, the spread trajectories are consistently positive no matter the 
origin of the shock ( tT , tN  or )tT⊥ ; at the same time, the respective conditional bands do 
not include zero (see Figures 11.a to 11.c). Focusing on Scheffe´s confidence band, the 
spread response to a tT , tN  and tT⊥  shock is positive up to the seventh, third and fifth 
horizon, respectively (see Figures 11.a to 11.c). In addition, the cumulative impact of the 
responses is positive and significant at the 0.01 significance level in all three cases. The 
magnitude of the Greek sovereign spread response following a shock on tT  is an 11 basis 
points increase at the first horizon and a 329 basis points cumulative increase (see Figure 
11.a). Following a shock on tN , the spread increases by 8 basis points during the first 
horizon and by 215 basis points cumulatively (see Figure 11.b). Finally, the increase in the 
spread following a shock on tT⊥  is 7 basis points during the first horizon and 220 basis 




28 Exception is France, where sporadic rejections (for four horizons) take place only when the orthogonalized 
Twitter variable is used (red-dashed line in Figure 10.f). It is worth mentioning that the cumulative twenty 
periods impulse response is negative, suggesting reduction in the spread (see Figure 11.r below) which points 
to flight-to-safety considerations. 
29 As an additional validation of the agenda setting hypothesis, we have executed an exercise focusing on the 
stock markets of GIIPS and France. Acting within the same methodological framework, we find that the 
results are not qualitative any different from the respective findings in the sovereign bond markets. We intend 
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Figure 11. Impulse responses. 
Notes : C. sum (20) refers to the twenty-horizon (days) cumulative sum of the impulse responses, while C. 
sum p-value is the resulting p-value for testing the hypothesis that the C. sum (20) is equal to zero. Finally, 




The impulse response analysis for the rest of the countries confirms the derived 
causal inference discussed above. For the case of Italy and Spain, although the impulse 
trajectories in all occasions are primarily positive, the Scheffe´s confidence bands embrace 
zero immediately after the second horizon (see Figures 11.g to 11.i and Figures 11.m to 
11.o, respectively). Moreover, for both countries and all instances, the cumulative effects 
(ranging between 1 and 12.9 basis points) are statistically insignificant. In Ireland, (see 
Figures 11.d and 11.e), both sources of news dissemination affect the spread in a 
comparable fashion as: (i) the impulse trajectories evolve similarly; (ii) the Scheffe´s 
confidence bands after the second horizon imply insignificance and (iii) the tT⊥  delivers 
responses that are indistinguishable from zero. Finally, the cumulative impact of tT  on the 
Irish spread is 12.5 basis points (being significant at the 0.1 significance level), while the 
respective impact of tN  is 7.9 basis points (being insignificant).  
For Portugal and after the first horizon, the Scheffe´s confidence bands support, in 
all cases, responses that wiggle around zero (see Figures 11.j to 11.l). Moreover, all 
cumulative effects on the Portuguese sovereign spread are insignificant. Finally, France is 
the only country where all the derived trajectories for the spread are in principle negative, 
although not different from zero (see Figures 11.p to 11.r). The twenty periods cumulative 
impact of both news sources is negligible and insignificant (-2.2 and -1.9 basis points), 
while significance occurs only after a shock on tT⊥  (see Figure 11.r and footnote 28). 
Overall, we may argue that the impact of Twitter on the Greek sovereign spread is 
positive and of higher magnitude than that of the traditional news outlets (both appear to 
significantly affect the Greek spread in the short run). Further, the predictive power of 
Twitter still persists even when we account for the effects of the traditional news outlets. 
Finally, the combined inference from the causality testing and the impulse response 
analysis indicate some weak contagion effects in the case of Portugal and Ireland.  
 
6. Discussion of results and conclusions  
This paper considers the relationship between social media (Twitter in particular) and 
traditional news with an application to the Eurozone bond market to reach the following 
conclusions. First, there is a bidirectional information flow between Twitter and traditional 
news outlets, suggesting not only that both types of news serve as important empirical 
predictors for the sovereign bond market, but also that the ‘old’ (traditional news) and the 
‘new’ (Twitter) media are connected. In addition, the impact of Twitter on the traditional 
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news is more prolonged, stronger and more robust in terms of significance, which points 
to the dominance of Twitter (over traditional media) as the agenda-setting news source in 
the context of the European sovereign bonds market. Second, the impact of Twitter’s 
“Grexit” mentions on the Greek sovereign spread is positive and of higher magnitude than 
that of the traditional news outlets; in addition, the predictive power of Twitter persists 
even when we take out the effects of the traditional news (by orthogonalizing the Twitter 
variable on the traditional news variable). Third, our analysis shows weak contagion effects 
from the informational content in Twitter and traditional news for the case of Portugal 
and Ireland.  
Our evidence of weak contagion effects might be related to the exposure of banks 
to Greek public and private debt. Recall that we find some evidence mainly for Portugal30 
and Ireland. Figure 12 reports Bank of International Settlements (BIS) data which shows 
that prior to the crisis, Portuguese banks had the highest exposure to Greek public and 
private debt (reaching 6.79% of their total exposure around the world in 2010Q1). In terms 
of timing, we observe that Irish banks decided to reduce notably their exposure to Greek 
debt earlier than everybody else in 2010Q4, that is, when Ireland itself was bailed-out for 
€85bn.31  
 
Figure 12. Exposure of IIPS and France to Greek debt. 
Notes: The data for the exposure of the IIPS banks to the Greek public and private debt (% of their total 
exposure around the world) come from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and cover the period 
2007Q1 to 2018Q1.  
 
30 Using a composite indicator that measures multidimensional sovereign bond market stress in the euro area 
from September 2000 to August 2018, Garcia-de-Andoain, and Kremer (2018) find spill-over effects from 
Greece to Portugal and vice versa. 




Our results highlight the importance of social media platforms, Twitter in particular, 
in predicting bond market movements over and above the impact of economic/financial 
fundamentals and more so, compared to traditional news. The dominance of Twitter over 
traditional media in affecting bond spreads suggests that financial markets are affected 
through the transmission information channel and more so by Twitter.  
Let us elaborate on this. Although crowd-sourced media, like Twitter, provide 
valuable signals for pricing assets in financial markets, these very signals may be blurred by 
the ‘many-to-many’ principle. Almost any individual can create and share content in real 
time (continuous information flow) which implies that Twitter, as a source, has a low 
signal-to-noise ratio. Hence, to disentangle the signal from noise, a considerable 
information processing capacity is essential. On the other hand, as traditional information 
sources deliver more curated news in discrete time intervals (discrete information flow), 
the signal-to-noise ratio increases compared to Twitter and thus, signal extraction demands 
lower processing capacity. Given the institutional investors’ ability to collect and process a 
large amount of raw data from multiple sources in real time fast and effectively, it is 
reasonable to assume that their processing capacity is, on average, superior to that of 
individual investors. It is thus harder for the latter type of investors to process effectively 
signals arriving from low signal-to-noise ratio sources. Hence, investors located at the 
lower percentiles of the investors’ processing capacity distribution are expected to draw 
information primarily from sources with higher signal-to-noise ratio. This suggests that 
information sources with low signal-to-noise ratio and continuous transmission frequency 
benefit investors with high processing capacity, while sources with high signal-to-noise 
ratio and discrete transmission frequency benefit mainly individual investors.    
Under the realistic assumption of a heterogeneous information processing capacity 
among the different types of investors, a non-uniform impact on the pricing of the 
underlying asset is expected for each news source, even in cases where they disseminate 
the same information. For instance, consider that information with valuable pricing 
content (whether good or bad news) is released. Typically, this signal is first broadcasted 
by news sources with continuous transmission frequency (e.g. Twitter) and attracts the 
immediate attention of all market participants (individual and institutional investors). But 
does this attention imply instantaneous reaction? On average, we expect that investors 
need time to process the content of the information before updating their information set 
and reacting accordingly. Since institutional investors have the capacity to process the 
information faster, they will be the first ones to react. As the initially broadcasted 
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information is reproduced by sources with discrete transmission frequency and relatively 
higher signal-to-noise ratio (e.g. newspapers), individual investors will then also process 
the signal and eventually react.  
The above reasoning suggests that institutional investors react, on average, to news 
coming from all types of sources (continuous/discrete transmission and low/high signal-
to-noise ratio). On the other hand, retail investors mainly react to news arriving from 
sources with discrete transmission frequency and relatively higher signal-to-noise ratio due 
to their lower information processing capacity. Overall, given that institutional investors 
account for a majority of the transactions in the bond market, their reaction is expected to 
have a greater impact on bond spreads than that of retail investors, therefore explaining 
the stronger influence of crowd-sourced media news.32 
It is also important to note that by considering the instantaneous manner in which 
social media information is spread, social media contribute to the efficient functioning of 
financial markets. Unless, of course, misinformation finds its way through social media 
platforms. In a recent paper, for instance, Fan et al. (2019) find that automated Twitter 
accounts (known as ‘bots’) can pump out messages that have the ability to affect public 
opinion and the stock market. This raises the important issue of regulating social media. 
The responsibility lies with media companies, journalists, and governments. Worldwide, 
there seems to be consensus among consumers that media businesses, journalists and 
companies like Google or Facebook need to do more to combat misinformation. When it 
comes to government intervention, however, a mixed picture emerges, with sentiment 
towards government intervention being stronger in Europe than in the US. This raises the 
issue of how effective government intervention might turn out to be, in the absence of 
coordinated governmental actions across the world.33 
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Appendix 1. Data  
 
 

















Figure A1.4. Within and between correlations by country. 
 
Notes: The blue area encloses within correlations for the traditional news (e.g. the value at line 1 and 
column 2 suggests that the traditional news time series of Germany has a correlation of 0.90 with the 
worldwide traditional news time series). The green area encloses within correlations for Twitter (e.g. the 
value at line 8 and column 3, suggests that the Twitter time series of Ireland has a correlation of 0.95 with 
the Twitter time series of UK). The black main diagonal illustrates the between correlations for the two 
news sources. (e.g. the value at line 4 and column 4, suggests that the Twitter and the traditional news 





















































Worldwide 0.89 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.92 0.82 0.79 0.90 0.89 0.76 0.95
Germany 0.97 0.77 0.72 0.85 0.86 0.90 0.68 0.71 0.74 0.85 0.64 0.87
UK 0.96 0.95 0.67 0.75 0.70 0.76 0.74 0.74 0.83 0.75 0.70 0.84
Italy 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.75 0.75 0.92 0.69 0.71 0.78 0.86 0.63 0.92
Netherlands 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.62 0.80 0.72 0.68 0.72 0.78 0.70 0.81
France 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.84 0.71 0.72 0.79 0.90 0.65 0.95
Australia 0.95 0.91 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.66 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.74 0.79
Ireland 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.54 0.71 0.73 0.65 0.78
US 0.92 0.91 0.84 0.90 0.87 0.92 0.83 0.87 0.63 0.76 0.76 0.88
Spain 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.95 0.88 0.84 0.93 0.80 0.60 0.66 0.89
Canada 0.89 0.84 0.79 0.87 0.83 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.96 0.76 0.54 0.73
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Figure A1.8. Eurozone risk proxy and Global Financial Stress Index 
 
Notes: The Euro area common risk proxy is identified by the difference between the return of the 10-year 
KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau) bond and the respective return of the 10-year German government 






Appendix 2. Summary of the results 
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Figure A2.1. Summary results for section 5.1. 
Notes: The bar length shows the twenty-periods cumulative response of one news source after a shock on 
the other news source; *** indicate the 0.01 significance of the cumulative response; finally, the number 
right before the letter h, imply the number of horizons for which the null hypothesis of no causality is 
rejected at the conventional levels of significance.  
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Figure A2.2. Summary results for section 5.2. 
Notes: The bar length shows the twenty-periods cumulative response of the spreads after a shock on the 
respective news source; ***, ** and * indicate the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 significance of the cumulative 
response; finally, the number right before the letter h, imply the number of horizons for which the null 









Table A3.1. Twitter activity predictability from the respective activity on Traditional news outlets and vice versa (Sample: 3-5-12 to 6-24-16).   
Panel A    
Sample period Hypothesis 
 Horizon 
 h 1=  h 2=  h 3=  h 4=  h 5=  h 6=  h 7=  h 8=  h 9=  h 10=  
Full-sample 
(3-5-12 to 6-24-16) 
            
t tT N  
 160.02*** 115.22*** 084.02*** 083.39*** 057.27*** 051.30*** 059.96*** 059.86*** 054.24*** 049.51*** 
   t tN T  
 023.66*** 023.28*** 015.84*** 014.39*** 012.31*** 022.82*** 016.90*** 014.87*** 014.35*** 009.54*** 
Panel B 
Sample period Hypothesis 
 Horizon 
 h 11=  h 12=  h 13=  h 14=  h 15=  h 16=  h 17=  h 18=  h 19=  h 20=  
Full-sample 
(3-5-12 to 6-24-16) 
            
t tT N  
 044.68*** 036.37*** 036.62*** 034.87*** 039.30*** 036.85*** 031.87*** 034.65*** 030.66*** 023.38*** 
   t tN T  
 012.03*** 012.45*** 015.57*** 014.15*** 010.16*** 012.11*** 016.51*** 013.29*** 009.91*** 010.78*** 
Notes: Dufour et al. (2006) Wald statistics (DPR) are reported. The symbol  denotes the null hypothesis of non-causality that runs from the left-hand variable to the right-hand 
variable. T is the logarithm of the Grexit mentions in Twitter and N  is the logarithm of the Grexit mentions in the traditional news outlets. The sequence of stars (*, ** and ***), 















Table A3.2. Sovereign spreads predictability in the GIIPS from Twitter and Traditional news (Sample: 3-5-12 to 6-24-16). 
Country Hypothesis 
 Horizon 
 h 1=  h 2=  h 3=  h 4=  h 5=  h 6=  h 7=  h 10=  h 15=  h 20=  
Greece 
. . . .t t E G L DT S  
 024.32*** 019.61*** 014.00*** 008.42*** 006.16*** 006.18*** 006.55*** 006.91*** 006.30*** 006.61*** 
. . . .t t E G L DN S  
 008.56*** 007.21*** 006.53*** 006.26*** 006.07*** 005.88*** 005.11*** 005.07*** 005.74*** 005.67*** 
. . . .t E G L DT S
⊥   012.63*** 011.85*** 010.48*** 006.74*** 005.11*** 005.89*** 005.70*** 004.99*** 004.50*** 004.33*** 
             
Ireland 
. . . .t t E G L DT S  
 007.85*** 006.10*** 005.46*** 003.95*** 000.60*** 001.13*** 002.96*** 004.11*** 003.93*** 004.52*** 
. . . .t t E G L DN S  
 002.94*** 004.62*** 004.40*** 004.28*** 002.41*** 001.14*** 001.52*** 003.51*** 004.40*** 004.98*** 
. . . .t E G L DT S
⊥   003.80*** 002.35*** 001.61*** 001.29*** 001.95*** 001.73*** 001.63*** 000.88*** 000.52*** 001.09*** 
             
Italy 
. . . .t t E G L DT S  
 002.75*** 002.43*** 003.46*** 003.26*** 001.45*** 000.41*** 001.32*** 000.14*** 000.18*** 001.76*** 
. . . .t t E G L DN S  
 001.85*** 000.55*** 000.89*** 003.05*** 004.17*** 002.56*** 000.41*** 000.16*** 001.15*** 001.12*** 
. . . .t E G L DT S
⊥   004.08*** 002.93*** 002.94*** 001.19*** 001.91*** 002.76*** 002.41*** 000.14*** 000.62*** 003.40*** 
             
Portugal 
. . . .t t E G L DT S  
 007.16*** 007.56*** 006.45*** 003.22*** 003.32*** 004.82*** 005.92*** 008.08*** 009.58*** 011.52*** 
. . . .t t E G L DN S  
 005.39*** 008.78*** 009.10*** 007.72*** 006.28*** 006.52*** 006.95*** 011.62*** 012.05*** 011.99*** 
. . . .t E G L DT S
⊥   001.81*** 001.54*** 003.03*** 001.46*** 001.55*** 001.96*** 001.64*** 000.51*** 000.22*** 000.95*** 
             
Spain 
. . . .t t E G L DT S  
 002.06*** 001.67*** 003.02*** 002.72*** 001.91*** 001.65*** 001.93*** 001.88*** 001.84*** 002.56*** 
. . . .t t E G L DN S  
 001.36*** 000.53*** 001.03*** 002.74*** 003.30*** 002.46*** 001.65*** 001.38*** 002.65*** 000.33*** 
. . . .t E G L DT S
⊥   003.56*** 002.52*** 003.70*** 002.40*** 002.59*** 002.86*** 001.18*** 001.70*** 003.75*** 004.41*** 
             
France 
. . . .t t E G L DT S  
 002.25*** 002.88*** 003.75*** 004.06*** 003.23*** 002.61*** 002.73*** 002.60*** 002.80*** 001.65*** 
. . . .t t E G L DN S  
 003.20*** 003.25*** 001.99*** 001.66*** 002.84*** 001.87*** 001.75*** 001.09*** 000.82*** 002.06*** 
. . . .t E G L DT S
⊥   005.04*** 005.31*** 004.72*** 002.75*** 001.95*** 003.46*** 005.68*** 004.77*** 005.58*** 002.83*** 
Notes: Dufour et al. (2006) Wald statistics (DPR) are reported. The symbol  denotes the null hypothesis of non-causality that runs from the left-hand variable to the right-hand 
variable. T  is the Grexit mentions in Twitter (logarithm), N  is the Grexit mentions in the traditional news outlets (logarithm), tT
⊥  is the orthogonal Twitter and S  is the sovereign 
spreads. . . . .EGLD  suggests conditioning on euro-zone risk, global financial risk, liquidity risk and default risk. Finally, *, ** and *** signify rejection of the null hypothesis at the 
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 significance level, respectively. 
 
